It is trite in legal practice that the doctrine of precedent and the sanctity of court orders form the bedrock upon which public confidence is built in the justice administration in any jurisdiction. A recent ruling from the High Court (Criminal Division) in Accra, however, serves as a serious reminder of how easily this foundation can be unsettled by the very institution responsible for upholding and maintaining its integrity. In the said decision, the Court did not only dismiss the contempt of court application, but proceeded to slam the applicant with punitive costs. The decision of the Court under review contains such significant legal and procedural missteps that it warrants a thorough critique, not to chastise, but as a crucial lesson in judicial vigilance.
The case under review is the case intitled: The Republic vrs Dennis Tawiah & Anor; Ex Parte: Francis Ayenu, SUIT No: CR/0132/2024 dated 20th May 2025 which involved an application to commit two respondents for contempt. The applicant alleged that the respondents had wilfully disobeyed a prohibitory order from the Circuit Court, Adenta and had also disregarded a pending injunction application before the Court of Appeal. The High Court dismissed the application in its entirety, a decision now on appeal. An analysis of the ruling by this author reveals a troubling departure from established legal principles on jurisdiction, the duty to obey court orders, the evaluation of evidence, and the award of costs.
A CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION
The Court began its analysis by attempting to resolve the issue of jurisdiction which was raised by the Respondents. The Court stated that the contempt application had two distinct legs. On the first leg, contempt in the face of the Court of Appeal ie the act complained affects disregard for the authority of the Court of Appeal for which the Judge ruled that only the Court of Appeal itself could punish for contempt committed against it, citing the principle that superior courts have the power to commit for contempt “to themselves.”
However, the above stated interpretation by the Learned High Court Judge, while seemingly straightforward, is an oversimplification of the law which sidesteps a more holistic and modern understanding of judicial power. The Supreme Court in Republic v. High Court (Land Division), Accra; Ex Parte Kennedy Ohene Agyapong stated emphatically that an attack on any one judge or division is an attack on the administration of justice in general. This vests the High Court, as a superior court of record with inherent jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction under Order 50 of the High Court (Civil Procedures Rules), 2004, C. I. 47, and Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459), Section 36(1). The contempt jurisdiction is in essence the power to protect the entire judicial system. To declare that it (the High Court) has no jurisdiction whatsoever in a matter touching on the authority of another superior court (Court of Appeal), especially when combined with disobedience of a lower court order, is to take an untenably narrow view. The High Court’s role is not so rigidly compartmentalised; its duty is to safeguard the entire edifice of justice.
The Cardinal Sin: Disregarding Binding Precedent
The most alarming aspect of the ruling was the Court’s handling of the Circuit Court order. The Judge found that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction under the Public Order Act to issue the order in the first place. The fatal error was what followed. Instead of applying the sacrosanct and binding Supreme Court principle laid down in cases like Tuffuor v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637, SC and Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex Parte Afoda (Attorney-General Interested Party) [2001-2002] SCGLR 774 that an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, even if erroneous, must be obeyed until it is set aside, the Judge chose to follow a conflicting, non-binding High Court decision.
It is respectively submitted that the decision of the Court is a grave judicial error. What the Court essentially said is that the hallowed principle of law that a party is to “obey now, challenge later” doctrine is a mere procedural nicety; rather that the linchpin that prevents legal anarchy. By endorsing the respondents’ decision to unilaterally disregard a court order based on their own assessment, aided by their lawyers of its validity, the ruling effectively encourages litigants to become judges in their own cause. It sends a dangerous message that the authority of the court is optional, contingent on a litigant’s agreement with the ruling.
A Flawed Assessment of Evidence and Punitive Costs
The ruling’s other deficiencies compound the initial error. The Judge dismissed the case partly on the grounds that the applicant failed to prove service of the Circuit Court order on the respondents. In doing so, she gave little to no weight to an official Police Report tendered in evidence, which enjoys a statutory presumption of regularity. She accepted the respondents’ bare denials over an official document, a clear misapplication of evidentiary rules as established in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Clah, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 890.
Finally, the award of a staggering GH¢140,000 in costs against the applicant is indefensible. A contempt application is quasi-criminal, brought to vindicate the court’s dignity. It is not a commercial suit for personal enrichment. To punish a citizen who brings a legitimate, non-frivolous action to uphold the rule of law with such high costs sends a wrong signal to the public who are needed to support the judiciary by ensuring that its integrity is maintained. Rulings as the one under review have the effect of deterring the public from acting as partners in safeguarding judicial integrity. The justification put up by the Court that the respondents reside in the UK was not only factually tenuous but legally irrelevant to the question of contempt as the same Court indulged the 1st Respondent throughout the proceedings by absenting from Court on multiple occasions and only attended court twice in a case that saw the party in court close to twenty times in a contempt matter.
The Role of Courts in Guarding Justice
This ruling, though it is from a single judge, highlights systemic risks in our justice delivery system. It underscores the need for justices to be ever-vigilant in upholding the core tenets of our legal system. To that end, our justices are encouraged to always:
Maintain Judicial Precedent: The principle of binding precedent is the glue of the common law. It is trite that a lower court is never at liberty to disregard a clear and established principle from a higher court.
Stand Firm for Judicial Independence: The “obey now, challenge later” rule must be enforced without exception. Any perceived weakness on this front emboldens impunity and erodes public trust. If our courts fails in doing this as clearly is the case in the ruling under review, our judicial system risks not being taken seriously.
Exercise Discretion Within Legal Bounds: The discretionary power to award costs must be exercised with temperance and for its proper purpose which is to compensate, not to punish a party for lawfully accessing the courts, especially in matters of public interest like contempt.
View Jurisdiction as a Coherent Whole: The judiciary is a single, interconnected body. The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly to protect the entire administration of justice from any and all attacks.
Public confidence in the judiciary is a fragile treasure. It is earned through unwavering consistency, intellectual rigour, and a fierce commitment to the rule of law. Rulings like the one critiqued here, however well-intentioned, chip away at that confidence. It is a collective responsibility for the entire bench to guard against such stumbles and ensure that the authority of the courts remains absolute, respected, and non-negotiable.
The author, Rev. Ben Taiwo Adekanla, Esq., is a private legal practitioner and the Managing Partner of The Shield Attorneys PRUC, based in Accra, Ghana. He served as the lead counsel for the Applicant in the case that resulted in the ruling under review.
In a recent decision by the High Court (Adenta) in Rev. Ebenezer Boadi v. Perez Chapel International; Suit No. H1/0034/2022 dated 10th January 2025, the Court affirmed a foundational principle in Ghanaian labour law: religious institutions are not exempt from respecting employment contracts and can be held accountable for unfair treatment of employees. The judgment, which upheld the Plaintiff’s claim of constructive dismissal, sends a clear message to churches and other entities that operate within the employment sphere.
Background
Rev. Ebenezer Boadi, who had served Perez Chapel International for nearly two decades in various capacities, brought an action against the church following his abrupt removal as Head Pastor of its Atomic Down Branch. Despite dedicating years to planting and leading the branch, Rev. Boadi was replaced without notice, salary, or communication – leading to months of joblessness and uncertainty. He later wrote to the church indicating that, by its conduct, it had constructively dismissed him from employment, and accepted the said constructive dismissal.
The Court’s Reasoning
After a full trial and evidence taking by the Court in a case that lasted for well over three years, the Court found that the church’s actions – including stripping the Plaintiff of his pastoral role, assigning guest preachers to his branch without explanation, and refusing to pay his salary – constituted constructive dismissal under Ghanaian law. This aligns with Section 63(3)(a) of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), which provides that an employee’s contract is deemed terminated if they are compelled to resign due to ill-treatment.
In reinforcing this principle, the Court drew upon local and international precedents, including George Akpass v GCB Bank Ltd [2021] GHASC 80, and Western Excavating Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICR 221, which emphasize that an employer’s conduct can amount to repudiation of the employment contract, entitling the employee to treat it as terminated.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the Defendant breached both the contract and the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to economic dignity and fair treatment, as guaranteed under Articles 23 and 24 of the 1992 Constitution.
Lessons for Churches and Non-Profit Employers
This ruling is a critical reminder that:
Employment contracts—whether written or implied—must be honoured.
Due process must be followed before taking disciplinary or dismissive action, including giving the employee a fair hearing.
Constructive dismissal is recognised under Ghanaian law, even in faith-based or spiritual organisations.
Religious bodies are bound by statutory obligations such as SSNIT and Provident Fund contributions.
Employers must treat workers with dignity, regardless of the spiritual or voluntary nature of the organisation.
Appeal vs Cross-Appeal and Broader Implications
The Defendant has appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal and Rev. Boadi has filed a cross-appeal seeking a variation of the judgment, particularly on the calculation of severance (which the trial court awarded from 2016 instead of 2006) and the amount of damages, which was pegged at GH¢50,000 despite apparent breaches of constitution, fundamental human rights of the Plaintiff as well as labour law and the law of contract. He also challenges the refusal of the Court to order the disclosure and payment of his provident fund contributions.
Conclusion
The High Court’s judgment marks a progressive step in enforcing labour rights within the religious sector. It upholds the rule of law in employment relations and sets a significant precedent that spiritual calling does not nullify legal obligations. Churches, NGOs, and other institutions must recognise that serving God does not exempt them from serving justice to those who work under their leadership.
As employment practices continue to evolve in Ghana, this decision is a timely affirmation that fairness, dignity, and legal compliance must remain non-negotiable standards in all sectors – sacred or secular.
The author, Rev. Ben Taiwo Adekanla, Esq., is a private legal practitioner and the Managing Partner of The Shield Attorneys PRUC, based in Accra, Ghana. He served as the lead counsel for the Plaintiff in the case that resulted in the judgment under review.
Introduction
The High Court’s ruling in Mulungushi Investment Limited v. Embassy of Hungary [2022], Suit No: CM/OCC/0472/2019 presents a classic judicial crossroads: one path leads towards a purposive, commercially sensible interpretation of the law, while the other retreats into the perceived safety of rigid literalism. In striking out the plaintiff’s suit, Her Ladyship Justice Afi Agbanu Kudomor chose the latter.
While grounded in the text of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (VCDR), the judgment is the product of a “timorous soul.” It is an anti-business decision that prioritises a fetishistic adherence to form over substantive justice, ignores the compelling evolution of restrictive sovereign immunity, and fails to grapple with the clear contractual intentions and subsequent conduct of the parties. This commentary will argue that the court’s hyper-literal reasoning creates a perilous environment for Ghanaian businesses and represents a missed opportunity to align Ghanaian jurisprudence with progressive international commercial law.
A Flawed Interpretation of Waiver and Conduct
The crux of the court’s decision rests on a flawed and overly formalistic interpretation of waiver. The court concluded that neither the tenancy agreement’s jurisdiction clause nor the Embassy’s active participation in the legal process met the VCDR’s high threshold for an “express waiver.” This reasoning ignores fundamental principles of contract law, agency, and estoppel.
Firstly, the court misread the meaning of “express.” The tenancy agreement explicitly stated that any dispute “shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with Ghanaian law” and submitted to arbitration in Ghana. An express term is one stated in words; this clause is unequivocally express. The court’s real, albeit unstated, issue was whether the Embassy’s Chargé d’Affaires could validly waive immunity on behalf of the “sending state.”
This is a commercial absurdity. A diplomatic mission is the designated agent of the sending state. To suggest that a contract signed by the head of a mission, explicitly submitting to local jurisdiction, is insufficient until a separate communiqué arrives from Budapest renders such clauses meaningless and invites bad faith. The purpose of Article 32 of the VCDR is to prevent inadvertent waiver, not to provide a tool for diplomatic missions to knowingly repudiate their contractual obligations.
Secondly, the court ignored the Defendant’s conduct, which screamed of waiver and estoppel. The Embassy did not merely remain silent; it actively invoked the Ghanaian legal system. It initiated a stay of proceedings to compel arbitration, participated in that arbitration for over a year, and even filed a counterclaim, an offensive act of invoking jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Atta Wusu v Fosuhene [2010] SCGLR 447, a counterclaim is an independent action. Having used Ghanaian law as a sword, the Embassy should be estopped from later raising immunity as a shield. The court’s perfunctory dismissal of this argument countenanced a clear abuse of its own process.
Mischaracterizing Commerce as Sovereignty
The court’s second critical error was its misapplication of the modern doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity, which distinguishes between sovereign acts (jure imperii) and commercial acts (jure gestionis). The court conceded the tenancy agreement was a commercial transaction but held that because its purpose was to house diplomatic staff, it fell “within the official function” of the mission.
This reasoning is fundamentally flawed. In modern international law, the nature of the act, not its ultimate purpose, is the determinative factor. As Lord Denning famously argued, when a state “enters into the market places of the world… it should abide by the rules of the market.” Renting an apartment is, by its nature, a private law transaction governed by contract and property law.
The court’s logic, if followed, would obliterate the commercial activity exception entirely. An embassy buying stationery or hiring a driver does so “in furtherance of its official functions.” Does this grant it absolute immunity from all local suppliers and employees? Progressive courts in Kenya (Unicom Limited v Ghana High Commission [2016], Civil Appeal no 56 of 2014) and Botswana (Sebina v South African High Commission 2010 3 BLR 723 IC) have correctly held that employment and tenancy contracts are private law matters not shielded by immunity. The High Court of Ghana per the ruling under consideration chose to ignore this compelling comparative jurisprudence, effectively granting absolute immunity for nearly all of an embassy’s local commercial dealings.
The Anti-Business Fallout of a “Timorous Soul”
This ruling is the product of a “timorous soul”, which refers to a judicial disposition so cautious of offending a foreign power that it tolerates procedural manipulation and injustice against its own citizens. Rather than interrogate the Embassy’s commercial conduct and bad faith, the court took shelter under a rigid interpretation of immunity, sacrificing the sanctity of contract—the very bedrock of commerce.
The consequences of this decision are chilling for the Ghanaian business community. It signals that diplomatic missions are a special class of contracting party, able to opt out of legal obligations at will. This is fundamentally anti-business and contrary to the spirit of Article 36 of the 1992 Constitution, which mandates the state to foster a conducive economic environment. A legal system that cannot guarantee that contracts with diplomatic missions are enforceable is not conducive to business. It erodes investor confidence and undermines Ghana’s reputation as a reliable commercial partner.
Conclusion
The High Court’s ruling in Mulungushi Investment Limited v. Embassy of Hungary [2022], Suit No: CM/OCC/0472/2019 is a regressive decision; legally, commercially, and morally. It sacrificed the plain intentions of the parties, the evolving standards of international law, and the demands of equity on the altar of a literalist interpretation of the Vienna Convention. In prioritising the perceived sanctity of a foreign flag over substantive justice for a local business, the court delivered a “timorous” judgment that fosters procedural gamesmanship and emboldens diplomatic missions to evade their commercial obligations. This case was not merely about legal doctrine; it was about justice. Regrettably, justice was the casualty of excessive deference.
The author, Rev. Ben Taiwo Adekanla, Esq., is a private legal practitioner and the Managing Partner of The Shield Attorneys PRUC, based in Accra, Ghana. He served as one of the counsel for the Plaintiff in the case that resulted in the ruling under review.